2. Translate the following passage in fluent Chinese (25%)
The other way in which Chinese realism differs is that its underlying theory of language has no clear counterpart to the familiar conceptual al structu ture of Western semantics. We find no concepts of beliefs, concepts, ideas, thoughts, meanings, or truths. Mohist thinkers create realist semantics out of the project of finding constant guiding discou urse ...'Their analyses use the pragmatic term ke (admissible) as pivotally as Western analyses use truth. [...J The deep concern continues to be guidance, not description.
Hansen, Chad (1992). A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought: A Philosophical Interpretation. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. (p. 235)
PART Ⅱ 請盡可能照字面上地(literally翻譯以下段落(40%),並且簡要說明此段落的主旨為何(10%)總 分50分 案:此處為現象學家Dan Zahavi批評兩位佛教學者Dreyfus和Albahari 認為自我(sclf)不存在的主張。 引文出自 Dan Zahavi,"The Expcriential Self: Objections and Clarifications," in Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson and Dan Zahavi, eds., Self No Self? Perspectives from Analytical, Phenomenological, & Indian Traditions. Oxford University Press, 2016.
"Let me divide my critical rejoinder into three parts.
1. First of all, I reject the univocal definition of self provided by Dreyfus and Albahari. Both are very confident in spelling out what a self is, and after having defined it, they then proceed to deny its existence. In my view, however, the definition they provide is overly simplistic. There is no doubt that some people have defended the notion of self that Albahari and Dreyfus operate with, but I would dispute the claim that their notion is the default notion, that is, that it is either a paricularly classical notion of self or that it is a particularly commonsensical notion, that is, one that is part of our folk psychology. Consider again the claim that the self-if it exists--is some kind of ontologically independent invariant principle of identity that stands apart from, and above, the stream of changing experiences s; something that remains unaffected by language acquisition, social relationships, major life events, perso s unchanging from birth to death; something that remains entirely onal commi nitments, projects, and values, something that cannot develop or flourish nor be disturbed or shattered. Frankly, I don't sce such a notion as being very much in line with our pre-philosophical, everyday understanding of who we are. As for the claim that the definition captures the (rather than a) traditional philosophical understanding of self, this is also something I would dispute. Just consider, to take some (not entirely) randomly chosen examples: the accounts we find in Aristotle or Montaigne (for informative historical overviews, cf. Sorabji 2006, Seigel 2005). In any case, when comparing the definition of self provided by Albahari and Dreyfus to the definitions found in contemporary discussions of self, it will immediately be evident that the latter discussi ions are far more complex, and far more equivocal, and that there are far more notions of self at play, including notions of ecological, experiential, dialogical, narrative, relational, embodied, and socially constructed seives. This complexity is ignored by Albahari and Dreyfus, and they thereby fail to realize that many of the contemporary notions of self- including those employed by most empirical researchers currently interested in the development, structure, function, and pathology of self-are quite different from the concept they criticize. To mention just one discipline that can exemplify this, consider developmental psychology and the work of developmental psychologists such as Stern (1985), Neisser (1988), Rochat (2001), Hobson (2002), or Reddy (2008). Thus, rather than saying that the self does not exist. I think self-skeptics should settle for a far more modest claim. They should qualify their statement and instead deny the existence of a special kind of self."
阿摩線上測驗
登入