三、以下史料是美國務卿魯斯克(Dean Rusk)與中華民國駐美大使葉公超(George Yeh)的會談記錄(拔萃)。 試根據此份史料論述以下問題。(1)魯斯克的要求及其理由為何。(2)魯斯克提及的all-or-nothing(包含 all-or- nothing position, all-or-nothing approach, all-or-nothing attitude)具體指什麼。(3)葉公超對應態度為何。 (40%)
Memorandum of Conversation
March 17, 1961
SUBJECT
Chinese Representation
The Secretary responded that he was not surprised that the GRC [Government of the Republic of China] hoped to continue the moratorium. However, he thought that the GRC should consider alternatives.
He pointed out that a growing number of United Nations members feel that the subject of Chinese representation should at least be discussed in the General Assembly. There was also a feeling among members that the moratorium was running out of votes and they were losing patience with it.
The Secretary emphasized that there would be no change in the bilateral relations between the United States and China. The United States would continue to recognize the GRC. On the other hand, there was no prospect that Peiping would be recognized both because of its own policy and of United States policy.
The United Nations problem was more complicated, however; the parliamentary situation there was very difficult. To us the most disastrous result would be to have the issue treated as a credentials question— as a question of which delegation should be seated in China's seat. If the moratorium expires, it means that a majority of members want to have the issue discussed, not necessarily that the majority wants Peiping to replace the GRC in the United Nations. A serious parliamentary threat, which we must guard against, is the technical possibility that a bare majority would decide that this is a credentials matter. We think it is not simply a credentials matter but an important matter of far reaching implications. The seating of the Peiping regime is not an objective of policy of some members who vote for the seating of Peiping or against the moratorium. The Ambassador asked if the Secretary was thinking of the United Kingdom. The Secretary said he was thinking of a number of countries. He indicated we should try to get away from the present deadlock which involves a considerable risk and produce another deadlock but on a more advantageous position. At this point the GRC should consider its attitude on this key question. How does it feel on the choice between an all-or-nothing position, on the one hand, and the determination to remain a member of the United Nations, on the other? If the GRC takes an all-or-nothing position, it is likely that a majority of United Nations members will insist on dealing with the issue as a credentials question. If the GRC concentrates on retaining its position in the United Nations, however, then the prospect is that Peiping will refuse to take up membership on the grounds that the GRC is still in the United Nations, and a deadlock will ensue for which Peiping will bear the responsibility. The Secretary said that if the issue were decided to be an important matter, there would probably not be a two-third's majority for any solution. The key point is the GRC's attitude on the question of all-or-nothing.
The Ambassador said he would faithfully report what the Secretary had said to his government. He regarded it as being very important. He could not answer the Secretary's question as to whether his government would take an all-or-nothing approach or concentrate on remaining in the United Nations. Although he could not give his government's answer to this question, as a personal footnote he could point out that in response to a strong recommendation on his part the GRC had instructed its Chargé d'A aires to remain in Senegal (at least temporarily) even though the Senegal Government had decided to recognize Communist China. Thus, for the time being any way, the GRC had not taken an all-or-nothing attitude in Senegal. The Ambassador also recalled the situation which had arisen in Melbourne in the 1956 Olympic Games. Dr. Yeh, who was then Foreign Minister, had decided to send a GRC team to Melbourne despite the presence of the Chinese Communists. As a result, Peiping withdrew from the Olympics. The Ambassador emphasized that in these personal footnotes he was not suggesting what his government's policy would be on the United Nations question. However, these were cases where his government had determined to participate regardless of whether the Chinese Communists came or not.
The Secretary emphasized that the GRC's attitude was crucial in the determination of how to deal with the subject in the United Nations. He noted that Peiping had made acknowledgment of its claim to Formosa a condition to United Nations membership. If the United Nations insists that the GRC retain an independent seat this would represent a major breach in Peiping's claim to Formosa, and require a major shift in Peiping's policy for it to accept United Nations membership.
Ambassador Yeh said he felt sure his government would not want to leave the United Nations in favor of Peiping but would stay on because it has a right to be there. However, the GRC would not want to change its national name. At the San Francisco Conference, the name Republic of China had been deliberately chosen instead of China by the Chinese delegation. Former Ambassador Koo [顧維鈞]had remarked at the time that this choice of name might be important as a criterion in the future (the Ambassador noted that the Chinese delegation had included Communist representatives). The Secretary doubted that much could be rested on this point in the United Nations. Dr. Yeh agreed, but reiterated the importance that the GRC attached to retaining its own name. If the Peiping government were voted in, it should be in its own name as the "People's Republic of China".
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