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 At that early stage of Google's development, the feedback loops involved in improving its Search functions produced a balance of power: Search needed people to learn from, and people needed Search to learn from. This symbiosis enabled Google's algorithms to learn and produce ever-more relevant and comprehensive search results. More queries meant more learning; more learning produced more relevance. More relevance meant more searches and more users.. . The Page Rank algorithm, named-after its founder, had already given Google a significant advantage in identifying the most popular results for queries. Over the course of the next few years it would be the capture, storage, analysis, and leamning from the by-products of those search queries that would turn Google into the gold standard of web search. 

The key point for us rests on a critical distinction. During this early period, behavioral data were put to work entirely on the user's behalf. User data provided value at no cost, and that value was reinvested in the user experience in the form of improved services: enhancements that were also offered at no cost to users. Users provided the raw material in the form of behavioral data, and those data were barvested to improve speed, accuracy, and relevance and to help build ancillary products such as translation. I call this the behavioral value reinvestment cycle, in which all behavioral data are reinvested in the improvement of the product or service. 

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This helps to explain why it is inaccurate to think of Google's users as its customers: there is no economic exchange, no price, and no profit. Nor do users function in the role of workers: When a capitalist hires workers and provides them with wages and means of production, the products that they produce belong to the capitalist to sell at a profit. Not so here. Users are not paid for their labor, nor do they operate the means of production, as we'll discuss in more depth later in this chapter. Finally, people often say that the user is the "product." This is also misleading, and it is a point that we will revisit more than once. For now let's say that users are not products, but rather we are the sources of raw-material supply. As we shall see, surveillance capitalism's unusual products manage to be derived from our behavior while remaining indifferent to our behavior. Its products are about predicting us, without actually caring what we do or what is done to us.

 To summarize, at this early stage of Google's development, whatever Search users inadvertently gave up that was of value to the company they also used up in the form of improved services. In this reinvestment cycle, serving users with amazing Search results "consumed" all the value that users created when they provided extra behavioral data. The fact that users needed Search about as much as Search needed users created a balance of power between Google and its populations. People were treated as ends in themselves, the subjects of a nonmarket, self-contained cycle that was perfectly aligned with Google's stated mission "to organize the world's information, making it universally acce essible and useful."' By 1999, despite the splendor of Google's new world of searchable web pages, its growing computer science capabilities, and its glamorous venture backers, there was no reliable way to turn investors' money into revenue. The behavioral value reinvestment cycle produced a very cool search function, but it was not yet capitalism. For all their genius and principled insights, Brin and Page could not ignore the mounting sense of emergency. By December 2000, the Wall Street Journal reported on the new "mantra" emerging from Silicon Valley's investment community: "Simply displaying the ability to make money will not be enough to remain a major player in the years ahead. What will be required will be an ability to show sustained and exponential profits."

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At Google in late 2000, it became a rationale for annulling the reciprocal relationship that existed betwe een Google and its users, steeling the founders to abandon their passionate and public opposition to advertising.... To meet the new objective, the behavioral value reinvestment cycle was rapidly and secretly subordinated to a larger and more complex undertaking. The raw materials that had been solely used to improve the quality of search results would now also be put to use in the service of targeting advertising to individual users. Some data would continue to be applied to service improvement, but the growing stores of collateral signals would be repurposed to improve the profitability of ads for both Google and its advertisers. These behavioral data available for uses beyond service improvement constituted a surplus, and it was on the strength of this behavioral surplus that the young company would find its way to the "sustained and exponential profits" that would be necessary for survival. Thanks to a perceived cmergency, a new mutation began to gather form and quietly slip its moorings in the implicit advocacy-oriented social contract of the firm's original relationship with users.
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 In other words, Google would no longer mine behavioral data strictly to improve service for users but rather to read users' minds for the purposes of matching ads to their interests, as those interests are deduced from the collateral traces of online behavior. With Google's unique access to behavioral data, it would now be possible to know what a particular individual in a particular time and place was thinking, feeling, and doing. That this no longer seems astonishing to us, or perhaps even worthy of note, is evidence of the profound psychic numbing that has inured us to a bold and unprecedented shift in capitalist methods.