110年 - 110 國立中山大學_碩士暨碩士專班招生考試_經濟所:個體經濟學#104433

1.(15%) Two persons are involved in a situation where the public good, G, is privately provided. The utility function of each individual is denoted as u_i(G,x) = a_i InG + x_i, for all i = 1,2 where x is a private good. Denote gi as the amount of the public good contributed by the individual i such that G = g₁ +g₂. Each individual's budget constraint is shown as x_i + g_i = my. Assume a₁ ＜ a₂. How much will the individual 1 contribute, i.e. g₁, in equilibrium?

2.(10%) Consider the game facing Player A and B below where X and Y both are integers. Nash equilibrium is (Up, Left). Find out the values of X and Y.

(A) What is Pareto efficiency? (5%)

(B) Does oligopoly imply inefficiency necessarily? Why? (5%)

(A) What is the tragedy of the commons? (5%)

(B) And how to fix it? (5%)

(A) What is transaction cost? Also with examples. (5%)

(B) What is the Coase theorem? Also with brief discussion. (5%)

(A)y=x1+x2,(5%)

(B) y = min (xy x간.(5%)

(A) What is the price which maximizes π? (5%)

(B) Following (A), what is the value of CS? (5%)

(C) And what is the value of deadweight loss? (5%)

(D)Let the regulator's objective function be O(p) = a ㆍCS + (1 - a)π, where a ＜ 0.5. What is the optimal price setting for the regulator? (5%)

(E) Draw a graph to demonstrate your answers through (A) to (D). (5%)

(A) What are the values ofθ, y and δ if the union is to maximize wage bill? (5%)

(B) What are the values of θ, y andδ if the union is to maximize the size of surplus over that generated by competitive conditions. (5%)

110年 - 110 國立中山大學_碩士暨碩士專班招生考試_經濟所:個體經濟學#104433

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