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> 110年 - 110 國立清華大學碩士班考試入學試題_經濟學系:個體經濟學#105241
110年 - 110 國立清華大學碩士班考試入學試題_經濟學系:個體經濟學#105241
科目:
研究所、轉學考(插大)◆個體經濟學 |
年份:
110年 |
選擇題數:
0 |
申論題數:
16
試卷資訊
所屬科目:
研究所、轉學考(插大)◆個體經濟學
選擇題 (0)
申論題 (16)
(1) (6 points) Mr. Wang consumes only coffee and coffee cake and consumes them only together (they are perfect complements). If we calculate a CPI using only these two goods, the CPI will differ from the true cost-of-living index.
(2) (6 points) Network externalities may result in consumers buying products that contain inferior technology.
(3) (6 points) When Mary raised the price of her home-made cookies, her total revenue increased. This suggests that the demand for Mary's cookies is elastic.
(4) (6 points) If marginal product is equal to average product, then total product is at a maximum.
(1) (8 points) If she pays NT$1,000 for a steak and NT$500 for a chicken, what is her optimal consumption bundle? Show her budget line, indifference curve, and optimal bundle, e
1
, in a diagram.
(2) (6 points) Suppose the price of chicken doubles to NTS1,000. How does her optimal consumption of chicken and steaks change? Show her new budget line and optimal bundle, e
2
, in your diagram.
(1) (6 points) What is the profit-maximizing output level for each firm? What is the total revenue? What are the profits?
(2) (6 points) If the fixed costs were $250 instead of $50, how does this change affect the firm's output decision and profits? Should the firm continue to operate?
(1) If the weapons producer can charge different prices to each country, what price and quantity will it sell to each country?
(2) If the weapons producer cannot price discriminate, what price and quantity of guns will it sell to each country?
(3)Will the weapons manufacture make more profit from price discrimination? Briefly explain. Why is that the manufacturer will likely be able to practice price discrimination?
(4) Which country will benefit from price discrimination? Which country will be worse off from price discrimination? Explain briefly.
(5) Is the deadweight loss higher under price discrimination or a single-price? Show mathematically.
5. (10 points) Explain why it is unwise to bid more than your valuation of the good in a sealed bid second-price auction.
(1) What are the corresponding Stackelberg leader-follower equilibrium output level and profits for two firms?
(2) Can Firm A deter the entry of its rival, Firm B? If yes, how?