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115年 - 115 調查特種考試_三等_化學鑑識組:儀器分析#143391(11題)

115年 - 115 調查特種考試_三等_營繕工程組:政府採購法#143390(4題)

115年 - 115 海岸巡防特種考試_五等_海洋巡護:航海學大意與輪機學大意#143389(40題)

115年 - 115 海岸巡防特種考試_四等_海洋巡護科輪機組:輪機工程概要(包括推進裝置概要、輔機概要與輪機英文)#143388(9題)

115年 - 115 海岸巡防特種考試_五等_海洋巡護:海巡勤務大意與海巡法規大意(包括海岸巡防法、國家安全法、海洋污染防治法、海關緝私條例、中華民國領海及鄰接區法、懲治走私條例、海岸巡防機關器械使用條例、臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例第二章行政與第五章罰則、中華民國專屬經濟海域及大陸礁層法)#143387(50題)

115年 - 115 司法、調查特種考試_三等_司法事務官法律事務組、法院書記官、檢察事務官偵查實務組、法律實務組:刑事訴訟法#143386(2題)

115年 - 115 調查特種考試_三等_財經實務組:經濟學#143385(8題)

115年 - 115 調查特種考試_三等_營繕工程組:結構分析(包括材料力學與結構學)#143384(4題)

115年 - 115 海岸巡防特種考試_三等_各科組別:海巡法規(包括海岸巡防法、國家安全法、海洋污染防治法、海關緝私條例、中華民國領海及鄰接區法、懲治走私條例、海岸巡防機關器械使用條例、臺灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例第二章行政與第五章罰則、中華民國專屬經濟海域及大陸礁層法)#143383(27題)

115年 - 115 司法特種考試_三等_檢察事務官營繕工程組:政府採購法#143382(4題)

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15. Suppose a negative externality exists in a market. If transactions costs are low and parties are willing to bargain, then, according to the Coase theorem, (A) An efficient solution can be reached regardless of the initial assignment of property rights. (B) An equitable solution can be reached only if property rights are assigned to the victims of pollution and not the polluters. (C) An equitable solution can be reached only if property rights are assigned to polluters and not to the victims of pollution. (D) Government intervention is necessary to reach an efficient and equitable solution.

14. Suppose the production function for good q is given by q = 3k + 2l where k and l are capital and labor inputs. Consider three statements about this function: I. The function exhibits constant returns to scale. II. The function exhibits diminishing marginal productivities to all inputs. III. The function has a constant rate of technical substitution. Which of these statements is true? (A) All of them. (B) None of them. (C) I and II but not III. (D) I and III but not II.

13. Which of the following statements about the prisoner's dilemma is false? (A) The prisoner's dilemma in a one-shot game leads to a noncooperative, equilibrium outcome. (B) The prisoner's dilemma game can never reach a Nash equilibrium as long as players do not cooperate. (C) The prisoner's dilemma in repeated games could lead to cooperation especially if there is some enforcement mechanism that punishes a player who does not cooperate. (D) Players caught in a prisoner's dilemma act in selfish ways that lead to an equilibrium that is sub-optimal.

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