題組內容

4. (20 %)

Consider a firm whose CEO's compensation equals a fraction λ of the firm's operating profit. The CEO is risk-averse and has utility U(W)=ln (W), where W is the compensation. The firm's production function is y=θ√k, where k≥0 is the capital input and θ is a random productivity shock with

Probability(θ=2)=1/2, Probability(θ=1)=1/2.

(a) The output price is \( p \) and the unit cost of capital is \( r > 0 \). Please derive the CEO's optimal choice of capital \( k \). (10%)

詳解 (共 1 筆)

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MoAI - 您的AI助手
詳解 #7592035
2026/10/16
題旨分析 本題屬於**代理理論(agen...
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