Lastly, games played by consumers may also affect the competitive effect of exclusive dealing. Suppose now that there are three identical consumers, \( E \), \( F \), and \( G \). Each consumer purchases at most one unit of product, and enjoys the consumption value (\( 4 \)). For the next two questions, suppose that Firm \( D \) faces a higher entry cost, \( 3 < f < 9/2 \). But the marginal cost of the two firms remains the same as before. Consider the following exclusive dealing contract. Firm \( C \) simultaneously offers the same conditions to all three consumers: The price (\( p^C \)) is \( 4 \), the sign-up bonus (\( x \)) is \( 0.01 \), and the penalty (\( d \)) is \( 10 \). Consumers simultaneously decide whether to accept the contract. Then, Firm \( D \) observes the content of the contract and how many consumers have signed, and makes entry decision accordingly. Other aspects of the game remain the same.